Patent Protection for CRISPR: An ELSI Review by Sherkow, Jacob S.
Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 565–576
doi:10.1093/jlb/lsx036
Advance Access Publication 7 December 2017
Essay
Patent protection for CRISPR:
an ELSI review
Jacob S. Sherkow1,2
1. Innovation Center for Law and Technology, New York Law School, NY 10013, USA
2. Department of Health and Policy Management, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health
E-mail: jacob.sherkow@nyls.edu
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the power of CRISPR—the workhorse genetic-editing
system first elucidated in 2012—and the public’s interest in it, both as a piece of
science and an ethical battleground.1 But there has also been extensive interest in the
variety of intellectual property issues surrounding CRISPR, including a heated patent
dispute between two of the technology’s originators, Jennifer Doudna (UC Berkeley)
and Emmanuelle Charpentier (Max-Planck), on one side, and Feng Zhang (Broad In-
stitute) on the other.2 While the intellectual property disputes concerningCRISPR are
far from over—indeed, like Tolstoy’sWar and Peace, new characters central to the dis-
pute continue to materialize3—five years of hindsight has given some perspective on
their ethical, legal, and social implications.
This brief essay reviews several of these issues: (i) difficulties with interinstitutional
collaborations, especially for lucrative ‘translational’ technologies; (ii) the rise of for-
profit ‘surrogate’ companies tomanage university licensing; and (iii) the use of patents
as a means of private governance to prevent potential abuses, such as ‘gene drives’,
1 See eg Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT TECH. REV., Mar. 5, 2015,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby/ [https://perma.cc/AT7T-
FM8Y] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing public perceptions of CRISPR); see generally CRISPR-CAS: A
LABORATORYMANUAL (Jennifer Doudna & PrashantMali eds., 2016) (teaching the method of using CRISPR
for gene editing).
2 See eg Jacob S. Sherkow, What the CRISPR Patent Dispute Is All About, SCI. AM., Dec. 12, 2016,
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/what-the-crispr-patent-dispute-is-all-about/ [https://
perma.cc/BA88-VUEN] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (synopsizing the CRISPR patent dispute).
3 See JonCohen,CRISPRPatent Battle in EuropeTakes a ‘Wild’ Twist with Surprising Player, ScienceNews, Aug. 4,
2017, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/08/crispr-patent-battle-europe-takes-wild-twist-surprising-
player [https://perma.cc/SZG3-CHRB] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (describing a new, fundamental CRISPR
patent in Europe owned byMilliporeSigma).
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seed-saving restrictions for agriculture, and germ-line human engineering. It concludes
with several observations—andprescriptive recommendations—for patent protection
related to academic, collaborative, cutting-edge research.
THE CRISPR PATENT DISPUTE
Since the first U.S. patent applications were filed for an engineerable CRISPR sys-
tem in 2012, the IP landscape has become significantly more crowded, with sev-
eral researchers controlling a few significant battlements. To date, three groups of
scientists have emerged as holders of foundational patents covering CRISPR-Cas9:
Jennifer Doudna (UC Berkeley) and Emmanuelle Charpentier (now at Max-Planck,
but at Umeå University, Sweden, at the time of her contribution to the invention),
Feng Zhang (Broad Institute), and Virginijus Šikšnys (Vilnius University, Lithuania).
Contrary to popular belief, Šikšnys was the first of the three to file a patent applica-
tion covering his variation on the technology. Šikšnys filed for his patent on March
20, 2012,4 although it did not issue—that is, it was not formally granted by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (U.S.P.T.O.)—until May 2, 2017.5 For a number of
reasons, Šikšnys’ contributions—both to the science CRISPR and the technology’s
patent dispute—have been overlooked.6 But Šikšnys’ patent covers using CRISPR-
Cas9 through an in vitro, pre-assembledCas9: RNAcomplex—also known asCRISPR
ribonucleoproteins—an important iteration of the technology for a variety of applica-
tions.7
More famously, Doudna and Charpentier first filed their fundamental patent ap-
plication covering CRISPR-Cas9 on May 25, 2012.8 Their original patent application
contained over 150 claims—particular ways to practice the invention that defined
the application’s boundaries—and was notably unspecific with respect to cell type.9
Nonetheless, Doudna and Charpentier’s patent attorneys pegged their clients’ inven-
tionbroadly, as theuseof a single-guideRNAtomediate the editingof genomicDNA.10
It was the ease, flexibility, and precision of this advance that has largely thrust CRISPR
into the lay lexicon.11
4 U.S. Patent Application No. 61/613,373 (filedMar. 20, 2012).
5 U.S. Patent No. 9,637,739.
6 See Sarah Zhang, The Battle over Genome Editing Gets Science All Wrong, WIRED, Oct. 4, 2015,
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/battle-genome-editing-gets-science-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/R2J5-
LKHT] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (expanding on Šikšnys as the ‘forgotten’ CRISPR scientist).
7 See eg Je Wook Woo, et al., DNA-Free Genome Editing in Plants with Preassembled CRISPR-Cas9 Ribonucleo-
proteins, 33 NAT. BIOTECH. 1162 (2015) (using the technology in plants).
8 U.S. Patent Application No. 61/652,086 (filedMay 25, 2012).
9 See Jacob S. Sherkow,TheCRISPR Patent Interference Showdown Is On:HowDidWeGetHere andWhat Comes
Next?, STAN. CTR. L. BIOSCI. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2015, https://law.stanford.edu/2015/12/29/the-crispr-patent-
interference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-here-and-what-comes-next/
[https://perma.cc/7WZB-2L44] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (summarizing the claims).
10 See Jacob S. Sherkow, Biotech Trial of the Century Could DetermineWho Owns CRISPR, MITTECH. REV., Dec.
7, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603034/biotech-trial-of-the-century-could-determine-who-
owns-crispr/ [https://perma.cc/3KUU-PD92] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (recounting Doudna’s attorney’s
argument before the U.S.P.T.O.).
11 See Megan Molteni, CRISPR May Cure All Genetic Disease—One Day, WIRED, June 7, 2017,
https://www.wired.com/2017/06/crispr-may-cure-genetic-disease-one-day/ [https://perma.cc/Q273-
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During the pendency of Doudna and Charpentier’s application in the USA, Zhang
also filed a U.S. patent application—directed specifically to eukaryotic applications of
CRISPR-Cas9.12 The principal improvement of Zhang’s methods over his predeces-
sors was the use of a nuclear localization signal and, separately, codon optimization to
natively express Cas9.13 But Zhang’s attorneys fast tracked his application through the
U.S.P.T.O., a relatively expensive and strategically risky process.14 As a consequence,
Zhang’s patent—even though itwas filed after applications fromDoudna,Charpentier,
and Šikšnys—was issued first in theUSA.15 That quandary gave rise to the now-famous
patent dispute in theUSA, the first round of whichwaswon byZhang.16The remainder
of it is still being appealed; a decision is expected in late 2018.17
The U.S. interference decision, however, stands apart from the rest of the world. As
detailed—excellently—by Knut Jørgen Egelie and his colleagues at Norwegian Uni-
versity of Science and Technology—the global CRISPR patent landscape is varied.18
Europe has now officially sided with Doudna and Charpentier over Zhang, although
opposition proceedings at the European Patent Office have just begun.19 And China,
too, recently sidedwithDoudna andCharpentier.20These conflicting decisions are fur-
ther complicated by a set of interlocking license agreements from the inventors’ biotech
companies, with a great deal of uncertainty playing out in the global commercial sec-
tor for CRISPR.21 Unraveling those agreements, and the issues raised by the patenting
of the technology in the first instance, speaks volumes about the values and pitfalls of
patents in the research enterprise.
INTERINSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION
One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and large, a dis-
pute between academic research institutions. It pits lawyers representing theUniversity
12 See U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (noting a provisional application date of Dec. 12, 2012).
13 Id. (‘The invention comprehends the expression of two ormore gene products being altered and the vectors of
the system further comprising one or more nuclear localization signal(s) (NLS(s)). . . . The invention further
comprehends the Cas9 protein being codon optimized for expression in the eukaryotic cell.’).
14 Petition to Make Special Under Accelerated Examination Program, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/054,414
(Oct. 15, 2013).
15 Compare U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (Zhang’s issued patent) with U.S. Patent Application No. 13/842,859
(Doudna and Charpentier’s patent application); see also Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPR Patent Interference
Showdown Is On: How DidWe Get Here andWhat Comes Next?, STAN. CTR. L. & BIOSCI. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2015,
https://law.stanford.edu/2015/12/29/the-crispr-patent-interference-showdown-is-on-how-did-we-get-here-
and-what-comes-next/ [https://perma.cc/7WZB-2L44] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (explaining the genesis of
the dispute).
16 Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
17 Kevin E. Noonan, Berkeley Files Opening Brief in CRISPR Appeal, PATENT DOCS, July 31, 2017,
http://www.patentdocs.org/2017/07/berkeley-files-opening-brief-in-crispr-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/
57GX-8UMX] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017).
18 Knut J. Egelie et al.,TheEmerging Patent Landscape of CRISPR-Cas Gene Editing Technology, 34 NAT. BIOTECH.
1025, 1025 (2016).
19 European Patent No. 2,800,811 (filed Mar. 15, 2013); see also Sharon Begley, University of California’s
CRISPR Patent Win in Europe Likely to Be Challenged, STAT NEWS, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.statnews.
com/2017/03/28/crispr-university-of-california-patent/ [https://perma.cc/E8ZB-Q4FF] (accessed Nov.
13, 2017) (reporting on upcoming challenges).
20 Chinese Patent No. 104,854,241.
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of California against lawyers representing the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard.22
To be sure, university rivalries are common.23 But because universities share among
themselves a largermission to create anddisseminate knowledge to thepublic, litigious-
ness among them has been historically rare.24
University-against-university patent disputes, like CRISPR, complicate interinsti-
tutional research agreements on several levels. First, they have the potential to chill
formal interinstitutional research collaborations among universities if the institutions
cannot agree on intellectual property issues beforehand.25 Universities may simply be
unwilling to enter into such agreements in the first instance, or, perhaps more perni-
ciously, discourage their faculty from informally developing suchnetworks.26 While the
empirical evidence for such a diminishment in collaborative efforts is slight—difficult
to demonstrate, in part, because it requires the proof of opportunities not taken by
universities—some recent survey data have found that ‘institutionally mandated [ma-
terials transfer agreements] put sand in thewheels of a lively systemof intra-disciplinary
exchanges of research tools’.27 Aside from this, there is substantial anecdotal evidence
of institutional difficulties in creating such agreements.28 It stands to reason that, at
least in some instances, these difficulties have ended some collaborations before they
could begin. More immediately, this is a current issue with the CRISPR patent dispute
given some internal dissention between Doudna and Charpentier’s respective institu-
tions concerning the intellectual property involved. Although Doudna and Charpen-
tier filed their joint patent application in 2012, their institutions did not formally assent
to a cross-licensing agreement until December 2016.29 If assenting to a cross-licensing
22 SeeBroad Institute, Inc. v.Regents of theUniversity ofCal., Patent InterferenceNo. 106,048, 2017WL657415
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
23 See eg GREG EMMANUEL, THE 100-YARD WAR: INSIDE THE 100-YEAR-OLD MICHIGAN-OHIO STATE FOOTBALL
RIVALRY (2005) (writing on the historic rivalry between the University of Michigan andThe Ohio State Uni-
versity).
24 See JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 122 (2016) (examining university patent
prosecution and assertion).
25 Jacob S. Sherkow, Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172, 173 (2016).
26 Id.
27 Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D.Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protec-
tion for Biological Research, 27 NAT. BIOTECH. 36, 36 (2009).
28 See egGideonD.Markman et al., Innovation Speed: TransferringUniversity Technology toMarket, 34 RES. POL’Y
1058, 1064 (2005) (‘ [C]ross-university collaborations . . . . may introduce another layer of complexity to
licensing and thus add time to the transfer process. This raises a question about the tradeoffs between the
value of insights derived from inter-university collaboration and the costs incurred due to licensing complex-
ity.’); Mel I. Mendelson & Mark Rajai, Students Patents on Inter-University Projects, PROC. AM. SOC’Y ENG’R
EDUC. ANN. CONF. & EXPOSITION 6.904.1, 6.904.1–6.904.2 (2001) (describing the difficulties in establish-
ing a patent agreement for student projects between LoyolaMarymount University and East Tennessee State
University); Dianne Nicol & Jane L. Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Is-
sues Facing the Australian Industry, CENTRE FOR LAW AND GENETICS OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 6 105 (2003),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2583508 [https://perma.cc/W978-583Q] (describing interinstitutional IP ten-
sions among Australian universities). But see Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis
of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NAT. BIOTECH. 1091, 1093 (2006) (‘Finally, the data concerning
the increasing secrecy of university researchers seem to indicate that there may be a conflation of patenting
and commercial and/or scientific competition as the cause of this trend. It appears that academic researchers
are becomingmore secretive, but that is not shown to be attributable to the patenting process, suggesting that
the solution might not reside in modifying patent policy.’).
29 CRISPR Therapeutics, Intellia Therapeutics, Caribou Biosciences and ERS Genomics Announce Global
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agreement for a single piece of technology has proved difficult, it is unclear how the two
institutions will deal with one another on future collaborations.
Second, even with some friction between universities over obtaining patents for
their researchers’ work, it has been rare for universities to sue one another regarding
inventorship—until now. In 2011, for instance, the University of Utah sued the Max-
Planck Institute concerning inventorship over a foundational groupof patents concern-
ing RNA interference technology.30 And since 2012, Stanford University and the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong have battled one another over lucrative patent rights
to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnostics.31 That dispute—despite several rounds of
appeals—is still ongoing.32 Such patent disputes are costly, high stakes, and high pro-
file. And while the CRISPR patent dispute itself is not a cause of such conflict, it has
become emblematic—and potentially prophetic—of the tenor of such disputes today.
Avoiding them in the first instance is a sensible institutional priority. But that some-
times comes at the cost of avoiding one’s colleagues.33
Third, even apart from the administrative institutional level, patent disputes like
these damper the culture of scientific collaboration, clearly something of tremendous
import tomodern science.34 Putting a price on a loosely defined culture of scientific col-
laboration is difficult—its loss is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, many of the most
significant breakthroughs of the past century arose in part from a culture of scientific
openness and collegiality.35 Abandoning that in favor of inuring patent rights to re-
searchers from a single institution seems, at best, unwise. Relatedly, it may erode scien-
tists’ penchant for honest, if critical assessments, of their ownwork among collaborators
and colleagues. A key piece of evidence used in the U.S. CRISPR patent interference
against theUniversity of California was a single one ofDoudna’s public statements that
her collaborators ‘weren’t sure if CRISPR/Cas9 would work in eukaryotes—plant and
animal cells’.36That statement has nowechoed throughout laboratories across theUSA
as a cautionary tale against critical reflections of one’s work—at least while patents are
pending.37
CARIBOU BIOSCI., Dec. 16, 2016, http://cariboubio.com/in-the-news/press-releases/crispr-therapeutics-
intellia-therapeutics-caribou-biosciences-and-ers [https://perma.cc/T6HG-P6DB].
30 Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 851 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
31 Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, 860 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
32 Id.
33 JohanBruneel, PabloD’Este&AmmonSalter, Investigating the FactorsThatDiminish the Barriers toUniversity–
Industry Collaboration, 39 RES. POL’Y 858, 859–60 (2010) (noting that IP conflicts act as a barrier to collabo-
ration).
34 See Sherkow, supra note 25, at 173.
35 See eg Clyde A. Hutchison, III, DNA Sequencing: Bench to Bedside and Beyond, 35 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 6227,
6230 (2007) (describing the collaboration to engineer DNA sequencing betweenMaxam and Gilbert); E.M.
Tansey & P.P. Catterall,Monoclonal Antibodies: A Witness Seminar in Contemporary Medical History, 38 MED.
HIST. 322, 327 (1994) (describing the collaborative efforts of the discovery of antibodies); James D. Watson
& Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan,Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 FASEB J. 8, 9 (1991) (discussing the
collaborative efforts of the Human Genome Project).
36 Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Cal., Patent Interference No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
37 Michael Eisen, Patents Are Destroying the Soul of Science, IT IS NOT JUNK (Feb. 20, 2017),
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Lastly, patent conflicts’ hindrance of interinstitutional collaborations may simply
be costly. Today, some research benefits from economies of scale, such as where
expensive equipment canbe shared among institutions.38TheNewYorkGenomeCen-
ter, for example, is a joint venture among several New York-area research institutions:
NYU, Columbia, Cold SpringHarbor Laboratories, to name a few.39 This arrangement
allows researchers at these institutions to share a fleet of Illumina X Ten sequencers,
the total cost of which—including operations—runs into the millions of US dollars.40
Where research funding is diminishing—as is sadly the case inmuchof theAnglophone
world41—universities may foolishly hesitate to engage in similar cost-saving arrange-
ments in the short-sighted hope of avoiding future patent lawsuits.42 One would hope
that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn’t warranted.
SURROGATE LICENSING
Interinstitutional tensions aside, the CRISPR patent dispute raises some signifi-
cant issues concerning patent licensing and commercialization—agreements between
universities and commercial entities over the use and development of CRISPR.
In CRISPR’s case, both the Broad Institute and the University of California have
employed a system of ‘surrogate licensing’: ‘outsourc[ing] the licensing and com-
mercialization of a valuable patent portfolio to a private company’.43 It is that
company—rather than university—that takes responsibility for licensing the included
patents to commercial researchers, including biotech startups and large pharmaceutical
developers.44
At the same time, the surrogate is frequently working to develop the technology it-
self.45 This is certainly true for CRISPR.TheUniversity of California has delegated the
entirety of its licensing rights to Doudna’s inventions to Caribou Biosciences, which
in turn has granted an exclusive license to develop human therapies to Intellia Ther-
apeutics.46 The Broad Institute, meanwhile, has employed Editas Medicine as its sur-
rogate for human therapeutics; the institute retains control over non-commercial and
(‘But this [was] an absolutely true statement that any good scientist would say even if they believed CRISPR
would work in eukaryotic cells. . . . Is this the lesson we really want to learn from CRISPR? That scientists
working in fields with commercial potential should never speak honestly about their work and the scientific
process?’).
38 Karla Hernandez-Villafuerte et al., Economies of Scale and Scope in Publicly Funded Biomedical and Health Re-
search:Evidencefrom theLiterature, 15HEALTHRES.POL’Y&SYS. 3 (2017) (reviewing the sometimes conflicting
evidence for economies of scale in biomedical research).
39 Institution Founding Members, NEW YORK GENOME CENTER, http://www.nygenome.org/about-us/#our
members [https://perma.cc/AVA6-9NNA] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017).
40 TheNew York Genome Center Purchases Illumina Hiseq X Ten Sequencing System, NEW YORK GENOME CENTER,
Jan. 22, 2014, http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/HiSeq-X-Ten-NYGC-Press-Release-FINAL
.pdf; [https://perma.cc/G4KZ-6EAF] Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 14-16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2928241 (discussing the cost
of sequencing operations).
41 See Simon Parkin, Brexit Is Quietly Strangling Science, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 8, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/features/2017-08-08/brexit-guts-british-science-and-risks-graphene-innovation [https://
perma.cc/9VD9-WVNV] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017).
42 See Sherkow, supra note 25, at 173; ROOKSBY, supra note 24 , at 126.
43 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21 , at 698.
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non-human therapy uses.47 Surrogates, therefore, ‘control a large and lucrative field for
the exploitationof the licensed technology, andhave significant freedomboth to exploit
it themselves and seek partners and sublicenses’.48
This system of surrogate licensing—while not unique to CRISPR—sets up several
obvious conflicts. Surrogates may very well be unwilling to sublicense their technology
to smaller biotech companies—who, in a very real sense, are rivals to the surrogate.49
Smaller companies seeking to develop similar uses of CRISPR to that studied by, say,
Editas are unlikely to receive patent licenses to do so—at least on favorable terms.50
Surrogates are also not invested with the same public duty as their related academic
institutions.Their duties, especially if they are publicly traded companies—as are Edi-
tas, Intellia, andEmmanuelleCharpentier’s owncompany,CRISPRTherapeutics—are
to their shareholders.51 In both real and legal terms, this duty tacks toward profit
maximization rather than, say, advancing scientific knowledge or public access to the
downstream products of their research—ideals typically lauded by research institu-
tions.52 With respect to this conflict between public-facing goals and shareholder value,
Michael Eisner, former CEO of Disney, put it best: ‘We have no obligation to make
history. We have no obligation to make art. We have no obligation to make a state-
ment. Tomakemoney is our only objective’.53 Lastly, surrogate licensing—even when
functioning well—may ‘bottleneck’ the commercial development of the underlying
technology.54 Surrogates may grant exclusive sublicenses that are too broad relative to
their licensees’ contributions; this blocks others from developing competing technolo-
gies.55 Surrogates may also grant licenses to disease indications or areas of the genome
far greater than any sublicensee can work at any given time.56 To be sure, bottleneck-
ing is a serious problem with respect to university licensing as well.57 But universities
are frequently more invested in nonexclusive licenses to commercial developers than
for-profit surrogates.58
ETHICAL LICENSING AND ENFORCEMENT
Most of the commentary on the CRISPR patents has been negative—and, in partic-
ular, the negative side of patenting the products of academic research.59 But—aside
from money—there are some significant social positives as well. At their core, patents
47 Id.
48 Id. at 700.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 SeeMark J. Roe,Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroomand in theCourtroom, 68BUS.L. 977, 993 (2013)
(noting the conflict between short-term shareholder value and long-term scientific research).
52 Id.
53 KIMMASTERS, KEYS TO THE KINGDOM 103 (2000).
54 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 700.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271,
279–80 (2017) (noting deadweight losses with exclusive university licensing).
58 Id. at 275.
59 See eg Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 698; Egelie et al., supra note 18, at 1030–31; Sherkow, supra
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are rights to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention.60 The corollary to
this axiom is that patents therefore allow their owners to dictate to the rest of the world
how to use the inventors’ technology.61This power to direct others’ research can be har-
nessed for societal good.62 Where the claimed technology raises ethical or social con-
cerns, patent holders have the right to tell their technologies’ users to behave ethically
and to provide access to downstream inventions.63 In this sense, patents—when used
well—can function as a powerful form of private governance.64
This is certainly the case with CRISPR, the ethical and social issues of which have
been explored at length.65 Onepotentially problematic use ofCRISPR is its use in ‘gene
drives’, a daisy chain of genetic editing that essentially forces future generations to in-
herit and subsequently pass on only a single variant of a particular gene.66 The concern,
as detailed by Kevin Esvelt, is that gene drives, because they are forcibly heritable, be-
come difficult to control once put in place.67 Should later research find negative, un-
intended effects of the particular genetic variant driven through the population, it may
simply be too late.68 To that end, Esvelt and others have proposed patenting the use
of CRISPR-based gene drives to, essentially, prevent others from using the technol-
ogy without rigorous scientific and ethical controls.69 The legal mechanics of enforcing
patent protection in this manner leave some gaps that likely need to be addressed. But
Esvelt’s proposal suggests, at a minimum, that patenting controversial technologies is
one possible tool to further their ethical use.
In other cases, rather than using patents to ethically restrict access to controver-
sial technologies, patents can be used to ethically promote access to the same. That is,
patent holders can demand licensees promise that theymake their technology available
to broad segments of society, and on fair terms.70 This is largely the case with Mon-
santo’s license from the Broad Institute covering the use of CRISPR-Cas9 for a variety
of agricultural purposes.That license essentially requires Monsanto to allow its farmer
customers to save and resew seed from one season to the next, in contrast to some of
60 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (‘[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.’).
61 See Tania Bubela, Jenilee Guebert & Amrita Mishra, Use and Misuse of Material Transfer Agreements: Lessons
in Proportionality from Research, Repositories, and Litigation, 13 PLOS BIOL. e1002060 (2015) (linking patents’
greater rights to exclude with the lesser right of limiting the underlying inventions use—typically throughma-
terial transfer agreements).
62 Christi J. Guerrini et al.,The Rise of the Ethical License, 35 NAT. BIOTECH. 22, 22 (2017).
63 Id. at 23.
64 Id. at 22 (‘By prohibiting uses the patent holder deems unethical, a patent license can function as a tool of
private governance.’).
65 See eg Regalado, supra note I.
66 See Ed Yong, One Man’s Plan to Make Sure Gene Editing Doesn’t Go Haywire, July 11, 2017, ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/a-scientists-plan-to-protect-the-world-by-changing
-how-science-is-done/532962/ [https://perma.cc/WSS8-BWC8] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing
Esvelt’s proposal).
67 Id.
68 Kevin M. Esvelt, Strategies for Responsible Gene Editing, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Jan. 25, 2016, https://www.
project-syndicate.org/commentary/crispr-gene-drive-editing-rules-by-kevin-m–esvelt-2016-01 [https://
perma.cc/ZP3A-89CX] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017).
69 See Yong, supra note 66.
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Monsanto’s past practices.71 Requiring this ofMonsanto provides greater access to the
fruits of CRISPR technology to farmers, who would otherwise be required to purchase
expensive new seed each year fromMonsanto.72 In the therapeutics context, similar li-
cense restrictions couldbeused, in theory, to require price controls, access plans, or that
research and development funds be used, in part, to develop treatments for neglected
diseases.73
And, perhaps counterintuitively, patents could also be used to ensure research ac-
cess to a variety of technologies. Patent holders can publicly commit to refuse to en-
force their patents against researchers or academic institutions. In the USA, these fre-
quently take the form of ‘patent pledges’—‘commitments made voluntarily by patent
holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their patents’.74 Doing so both
prevents others from patenting—and suing others—on the same technology, and dis-
suades less ethically minded competitors from entering the field.75 Patent holders can
also use open licensing systems to researchers interesting in developing and sharing the
technology for the public good. In theCRISPR context, this non-commercial use isme-
diated through a non-profit organization, AddGene, a company that provides access to
CRISPR constructs and plasmids through a standardized BiologicalMaterials Transfer
Agreement (BMTA). AddGene’s BMTA’s contains patent licenses for academic use of
the underlying technology.76
To be sure, these restrictions have the potential for abuse. One scientist’s ethi-
cal restriction is another’s unethical impediment to research. The Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF), for example, owns many patents directed to hu-
man embryonic stem cells (hESC), methods of use and propagation and thera-
pies potentially derived from their use.77 But facing public controversy over the
technology—and a moralistic Congress then threatening to restrict federal funding
covering the technology—WARFhas imposed restrictions on its hESC patent licenses
concerning their technology’s use in connection ‘non-humanembryos’.78These restric-
tions have aroused some ire among the scientific community, many of whom view the
limitations not as an ethical fence, but an impermissible walling off of secular research
for religious purposes.79
Importantly, too, the overreliance on patents as vehicles promoting the ethical uses
of technology may crowd out other equally effective—and less restrictive—forms
of control. Patents, of course, are not the only means of private governance to reign
in ethically unruly technology. The BioBrick Foundation, a research platform for
71 Id. at 24.
72 Id.
73 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg &W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, J. L. &
BIOSCI. 3, 18 (2017) (noting that health care payers have the information and incentives to impose demands
on drug developers).
74 Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 546 (2015).
75 See Id.
76 AddGene UBMTA, ADDGENE, https://www.addgene.org/terms/1047/ [https://perma.cc/ZG5K-4YFP]
(accessed Nov. 13, 2017).
77 John M. Golden,WARF’s Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to Re-
search, J. L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 314 (Summer 2010).
78 Id. at 319.
79 Id. (‘In any event, outside researchers do not seem always to have distinguished, or to have been able to dis-
tinguish, between ethical and proprietary motivations forWARF’s restrictions, which a number of researchers
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‘synthetic biology’, famously abandoned patents as a tool for ethical governance in fa-
vor of standardized, contractual, materials transfer agreements—namely, the BioBrick
User Agreement (BUA).80 The BUA itself contains, in essence, ethical
restrictions—notably, § 5, which prohibits ‘intentionally harmful, negligent, or
unsafe uses’.81 While the enforceability of the agreement is questionable, it stands
testament to the possibility of private ethical governance of platform technologies
outside of patent assertion. In any event, the contrast among theWARF hESC patents,
AddGene’s BMTA, and the BUA demonstrates that, like CRISPR itself, patents are
tools that can be used for good or for ill. At a minimum, ethically responsible patent
pledges demonstrate the capacity of using patents as a tool for the public good.
CONCLUSIONS
In many ways, the ethical, legal, and social issues of CRISPR patenting are idiosyn-
cratic. It is not often that a ground-breaking genetic engineering technology is invented,
with monumental import to therapy, human reproduction, and social order.82 And
it is perhaps rarer still that such an important technology becomes the subject of a
contentious patent dispute among some of the world’s highest esteemed research in-
stitutions. Nonetheless—despite claims that the CRISPR patent dispute is a unique
event—there are some greater lessons to be learned about the ethical, legal, and social
implications of intellectual property in research science.
The first, and perhaps most important for day-to-day scientific practice, is
that patents—their promises and pitfalls—should not ruin research collaborations.
Science, and molecular biology in particular, is largely a team sport.83 Researchers
seeking to make the most significant advances in their fields must increasingly turn
to others at the fringe of their disciplines for help.84 In biology, this is perhaps best
exemplified by the recent explosion of collaboration betweenmolecular geneticists and
computer scientists, the informational yields of which have been tremendous.85 Even
in the CRISPR context itself, it’s worth reiterating that the two warring factions made
their advances through collaborative efforts, despite patent disputes within research
groups: Doudna with Charpentier; and Zhang with Luciano Marraffini of Rockefeller
80 The BioBrick User Agreement, BioBricks Foundation, https://biobricks.org/bpa/users/agreement/
[https://perma.cc/Y6HD-9WXA] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) [hereinafter BUA]; see also David Singh
Grewal, Before Peer Production: Infrastructure Gaps and the Architecture of Openness in Synthetic Biology, 20
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 143, 180–187 (2017) (exhaustively describing the BUA and its implications).
81 BUA, supra note 80 .
82 AlthoughCRISPR’smagnitude, as a biological tool, is not unique. RecombinantDNA, the discovery of hESCs,
and the engineering of monoclonal antibodies have similarly challenged law, science, and ethics when they
were first announced. See generally GEORGE CHURCH AND ED REGIS, REGENESIS: HOW SYNETHETIC BIOLOGY
WILL REINVENT NATURE AND OURSELVES (2012) (discussing each of these technologies and their impact on
synthetic biology).
83 Janet D. Stemwedel, The Objectivity Thing (Or, Why Science Is a Team Sport), SCI. AM., July 20, 2011,
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/doing-good-science/httpblogsscientificamericancomdoing-good-
science20110720the-objectivity-thing-or-why-science-is-a-team-sport/ [https://perma.cc/ENR9-SDYE]
(accessed Nov. 13, 2017).
84 See Jacob S. Sherkow,Negativing Invention, 2011 BYUL.REV. 1091, 1118–19 (describing the innovation trend
to combine widely disparate fields of art).
85 Minoru Kanehisa & Peer Bork, Bioinformatics in the Post-Sequence Era, 33 NAT. GENET. 305, 305 (2003) (dis-
cussing the rise of bioinformatics as a scientific discipline); Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai,When Bio-
pharmaMeets Software: Bioinformatics at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. L. J. & TECH. 206, 206–07 (describing the
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University.86 CRISPR research has now largely become international in scope despite
a thicket of global and interinstitutional patent issues.87 It is doubtful that further ad-
vances could be made without such teams. Patent incentives should not act as collabo-
rative disincentives.
Another lesson to be drawn is the potential power of scientists—not just
lawyers—over the use and abuses of their patents. Researchers often have some sig-
nificant say in how their home institutions can use their patented technology—from
who should receive a license to the royalty rate and terms set for competitors.88
Indeed, academic inventors are frequently the founders or co-owners of spinout com-
panies to whom their institutions farm out patent sublicensing work.89 Doudna, for ex-
ample, is the co-founder of Caribou Biosciences, the University of California’s patent
surrogate; Charpentier, CRISPRTherapeutics; and Zhang, Editas Medicine.90 Inven-
tor researchers with academic spinouts therefore have some control in how their tech-
nologywill ultimately beused. Scientistswith careers otherwise dedicated to the greater
good should leverage this power; they should engage with and negotiate with their in-
stitutions to responsibly develop the fruits of their efforts. They should not abandon
these concerns to university administrators or their companies’ shareholders.
Lastly, the ethical, legal, and social implications of the CRISPR patents have some-
thing to say about academic patenting, in general. Currently, a great deal of the aca-
demic literature on IP paints patents with a normative brush—patents are ‘good’;
patents are ‘bad’.91 More nuanced, economically sophisticated discussions of these po-
sitions cast them in terms of efficiency.92 But the CRISPR patent controversies teaches
us that patents, like kitchen knives, are simply tools, without a moral valence sepa-
rate from their users. Patents, like the CRISPR patents, can be used in ways that im-
pede further research.93 Or, they can be used to promote, if not demand, their ethical
application.94 The patents themselves do not do these things; the outcomes depend
86 Jon Cohen, How the Battle Lines Over CRISPR Were Drawn, SCIENCE NEWS, Feb. 15, 2017,
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/how-battle-lines-over-crispr-were-drawn [https://perma.cc/
ZMA5-Y2FU] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (describing the relationships between Doudna and Charpentier as
well as between Zhang andMarraffini).
87 Egelie et al., supra note 18, at 1030–31.
88 See Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: Faculty Decisions and Institutional Success at
Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99, 106 (2001) (describing concerns of academic scientists over
use of their patented technology); LynneG. Zucker&Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional Trans-
formation: Patterns of Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry, 93 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. USA 709, 709 (1996) (examining that faculty input of star scientists is a significant factor affecting
technology transfer offices’ decision to create spinouts).
89 See JorgeL.Contreras&CharlesR.McManis,CatalyzingTechnologyDevelopmentThroughUniversity Research,
inRESEARCHHANDBOOKON INTELLECTUALPROPERTY ANDCLIMATECHANGE 237 (JoshuaD. Sarnoff ed. 2016)
(describing the creation of spinouts).
90 About Us, CRISPR THERAPEUTICS, http://www.crisprtx.com/about-us/scientific-founders-advisors.php
[https://perma.cc/T7UB-MKYN] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Origins, CARIBOU BIOSCIENCES,
http://cariboubio.com/origins [https://perma.cc/SMH8-7KHU] (accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Our Team,
EDITAS MEDICINE, http://www.editasmedicine.com/our-team [https://perma.cc/UA2W-AUFY] (accessed
Nov. 13, 2017).
91 See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1331 (2015) (casting the aca-
demic literature in these normative terms).
92 See Id. at 1332–35 (describing some of the economic literature on the ‘patent system’, writ large).
93 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 21, at 698.
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entirely onwho’s wielding them. To that end, theCRISPR patent controversies should
encourage researchers to think about how, and by whom, their inventions will ulti-
mately be used—both for those seeking to use them for good or for ill.
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